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Safe breathing air for space faring crews is essential whether they are inside an Extravehicular 
Mobility Suit (EMU), a small capsule such as Soyuz, or the expansive International Space Station 
(ISS). Sources of air pollution can include entry of propellants, excess offgassing from polymeric 
materials, leakage of systems compounds, escape of payload compounds, over-use of utility 
compounds, microbial metabolism, and human metabolism. The toxicological risk posed by a 
compound is comprised of the probability of escaping to cause air pollution and the magnitude 
of adverse effects on human health if escape occurs. The risk from highly toxic compounds is 
controlled by requiring multiple levels of containment to greatly reduce the probability of 
escape; whereas compounds that are virtually non-toxic may require little or no containment. 
The potential for toxicity is determined by the inherent toxicity of the compound and the 
amount that could potentially escape into the breathing air. This reflects the fundamental 
premise in toxicology that “dose makes the poison.” 
During almost a half-century of human spaceflight, space faring nations have learned to control 
toxicological risks well, but some of our lessons learned have been acquired the hard way – that 
is by events that have placed the crew at risk of harm. We learned not to put pressure-
equalization valves too near thrusters when the Apollo capsule became highly polluted with 
nitrogen tetroxide during the descent of the capsule through the atmosphere. Thrusters were 
firing in an attempt to stabilize the descending capsule at the same time outside air was 
allowed in to increase the capsule pressure to sea level. The crewmembers experienced 
respiratory symptoms and delayed release of fluid into the lung. They were treated with oral 
steroids and released from the hospital 6 days after landing. No lasting effects have been 
reported. 
Fires, whether smoldering or openly burning, are frightening events during spaceflight. The 
toxicological threat from a fire cannot be judged from the apparent seriousness of the fire. For 
example, in 1997 aboard the Mir Station, a solid fuel oxygen generator caught fire and burned 
openly the cabin for at least a minute. Samples of air revealed that dangerous combustion 
toxicants, such as carbon monoxide, remained at somewhat elevated but safe levels. The Mir 
air revitalization system restored the air to nominal conditions within 1 ½ days and there were 
no adverse effects on the crew. In contrast, a year later the trace contaminant control system in 
the Mir Station produced a small amount of smoke when a heat-regenerated filter was 
prematurely placed into the flow stream. This caused a cellulose component to smolder. The air 
was cleared quickly of the smoke, but an experimental instrument suggested that levels of 
carbon monoxide were worrisome (these levels were confirmed later by ground-based analysis 
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of samples acquired during the event). The crew reported no symptoms and went about their 
duties. A few hours later the crew reported nausea and headache. These symptoms were 
consistent with the indicated levels of carbon monoxide. Carbon monoxide can require hours to 
enter the blood via the lungs and bind to hemoglobin where it blocks oxygen exchange. The 
crew recovered from their exposures by the next day as carbon monoxide levels decreased; 
however, it is known that exposures roughly double those experienced in this incident could 
have been lethal. Design and operational changes were made to reduce the risk of fire in both 
units. 
Excess offgassing from overheated polymeric materials can rapidly pose a threat to air quality. 
During the STS-40 Spacelab mission, an acrid odor was noted from the Orbiter Refrigerator 
Freezer (ORF). The odor was rapidly getting worse, so the unit was shut down and all openings 
were covered with duct tape. Inspection of the ORF on the ground revealed that a small motor 
with a Delrin® frame had overheated. Heated Delrin® produces formaldehyde. This irritating 
compound and others thought to be produced in the event had seriously polluted the 
atmosphere. The cause of the overheating had been a seized motor and no thermal protection 
to stop the current from trying to rotate the motor. Henceforth, thermal cutouts have been 
required on any devices that could overheat to a level capable of polluting the cabin or starting 
a fire. Although this event made for an unpleasant experience on orbit, the crew suffered no 
lasting effects. 
Toxicological accidents can originate in unexpected ways and from unusual sources. During the 
STS-55 Space Shuttle mission the waste management system failed; therefore, waste was being 
stored in contingency waste bags. The crew reported that the bags were not leaking; however, 
a noxious odor was emanating from them. Because of the persistent odors, the crew refused to 
continue squeezing the bags to empty their contents into space. It was late in the mission and 
ground controllers concurred with the crew’s decision. An air sample, analyzed later on the 
ground, revealed that methyl sulfide compounds were being produced inside the bags. These 
compounds, originating from microbial metabolism, were small enough to penetrate the walls 
of the bag. This incident serves as a reminder that microbial hygiene is critical to maintaining air 
quality and that bags designed to hold liquids may not retain small, gaseous compounds. 
Toxicological risks sometimes originate from totally unpredictable sources. An example of this 
occurred aboard the ISS after mission 7A.1. During that mission Metox filters from the EMU 
suits were placed in the regeneration apparatus. Regeneration involves flowing hot air through 
the canisters to desorb pollutants from the filters into the ISS atmosphere. The apparatus was 
not performing as the crew expected, so they stopped the process and the canisters remained 
in the regeneration apparatus for about 6 months, during which unheated ISS air slowly passed 
through the canisters. When the next crew attempted to regenerate the canisters the flow 
from the apparatus produced noxious pollutants. The process was stopped, and the crew took 
refuge in the Russian segment of ISS for 30 hours while the air in the U.S. segment was 
scrubbed. During the 6 month period, the charcoal elements in the canisters had slowly 
absorbed ISS air pollutants, and the regeneration process had rapidly removed these 
compounds and dumped them into the ISS atmosphere. The major compounds found in an air 
sample were ethyl acetate and n-butanol. There was no apparent harm to the crew; however, 
considerable resources were expended in managing the pollutants and then understanding 
what happened and ensuring that there would be no repeat of this event. 
Space toxicologists, in cooperation with engineers, crew trainers, operations personnel, and 
other technical groups, focus on prevention of air pollution within habitable areas through 
many careful controls; however, our efforts are not always successful. In order to manage the 
inevitable toxicological events when they occur, we are expanding our air monitoring 
capabilities aboard the ISS. Our ultimate goal is for exploration crews to have all the tools they 
need to manage any plausible toxicological problem that could occur when they cannot rely on 
ground assistance. 
 
Normal Roentgenogram (left) and one from an Apollo astronaut accidentally exposed to 
propellants during capsule descent (right). The second figure suggests fluid infiltrate of the 
lungs. Credits: NASA/JSC 
 Remains of the solid fuel oxygen generator that combusted aboard Mir space station in 1997. 
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Motor from STS-40 Orbiter Refrigerator/Freezer that produced formaldehyde during 
overheating. Credits: NASA/JSC 
